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Abstract—Optical networks are prone to physical layer attacks,
in particular the insertion of high jamming power. In this paper,
we present a study of jamming attacks in elastic optical networks
(EON) by embedding the jamming into the physical layer model,
and we analyze its impact on the blocking probability and slots
utilization. We evaluate our proposed model using a single link
and a network topology and we show that for in-band- jamming,
the slots utilization decreases with the increase of jamming power,
and becomes null when the jamming power is higher than 3 dB,
while for out-of-band jamming, the impact is maximal for a
specific jamming power, 1.75 dB in our simulation. Considering
multiple positions of attackers, we attained the highest blocking
probability 32% for a specific jamming power 2 dB. We conclude
that the impact of jamming depends on attacker positions as well
as the jamming power.
I. INTRODUCTION
Elastic Optical Networks (EON) are highlighted as a pos-
sible infrastructure for large core networks, which make it
critical to assure its security. Generally, optical networks
are vulnerable to different types of attacks, including power
jamming attacks [1]. This physical attack consists on the
insertion of high power signal over a specific frequency chosen
by the attacker in order to decrease the signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR). The jamming attacks are classified into two main
types: in-band jamming and out-of-band jamming. The in-
band jamming considers the insertion of the high power
signal over a frequency within the transmission window to
disrupt connections that use the jammed slots. The out-of-band
jamming considers the insertion of the high power signal out
of the transmission band to disrupt connections that use the
neighboring slots to the jammed ones.
Previous research studied jamming attacks using
experiments [2]–[4] or simulations [5], [6]. Most works
are focused on proposing solutions and models for detecting
jamming attacks [3], [5], [7] or protecting the network
against its occurrence [8]–[11]. However, before studying
how to detect jamming attacks, or to design prevention
mechanism, it is important to go back to the origin of the
physical attack and analyze the non-linearity effects added
by the insertion of a high power signal. An integration of
jamming attacks model with the physical layer model is still
missing in the literature. By simply having such integration
to the physical layer model, we can derive a new analysis for
jamming attacks, which does not exist in the current literature.
This work proposes a modeling for jamming attacks, in-
band and out-of-band jamming, considering the embedding of
the additional signal power into the physical layer model as
non-linear impairments. A general physical layer model [12]
is used as reference for the power insertion, which causes a
reduction in the Quality of Transmission (QoT) of the network
circuits.
Our analysis shows that the proposed modeling reveals the
non-linear characteristics of jamming attacks. To understand
those characteristics, it is important to observe the impact
of in-band and out-of-band jamming on slots utilization and
the blocking probability. We studied two different network
topologies, a single link and a small network of 6 nodes,
considering different values of jamming power. We discussed
as well the case of multiple attackers, where each one is using
different frequency slots range. The results associated to in-
band jamming, showed that slots utilization decreases with
the increase of jamming power, and becomes null when the
jamming power is higher than 3 dB. On the other hand, the
results observed for out-of-band jamming, which aims to harm
neighboring circuits, shows that the impact is maximal for
a specific jamming power, 1.75 dB in our simulation, and
decreases when we use higher jamming power. Using multiple
positions of attackers, we obtained the highest blocking prob-
ability 32% for a specific jamming power 2 dB, as a result, we
conclude that the impact of jamming depends on the jamming
power as well as attacker positions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
shows the proposed jamming model for EON. Section III
presents the performance evaluation for the proposed model.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section IV.
II. JAMMING ATTACK MODEL IN EON
The infrastructure is modeled as a graph G = (V,E), where
V represents the set of nodes consisting of transceivers and
routing devices, and E the set of optical links. An optical
link contains a set of connected fiber spans, such that each
span is an optical fiber followed by an erbium-doped fiber
amplifier (EDFA). Each link can transmit M slots. We define
the center frequency fm, the bandwidth ∆fm, and the power
Pm, for each channel m = 1, ...,M . The studied network
can support an enormous number of connections established
between different nodes and following a predefined route. A
connection i can be associated to a route ri, where ri is a
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Fig. 1. An Illustration of In-band and out-of-band Jamming Attack in EON
set of links starting from the source node and ending by the
destination node of connection i.
There are two types of jamming attacks: In-band jamming
in which an attacker inserts a relatively high power signal
over either a channel within the transmission window, i.e.
the attacker can get access to an optical fiber, bend it, then
insert a slightly high power to the victim channel. Out-of-
band jamming where the high power signal is inserted out
of the transmission band of legitimate data channels, i.e. the
attacker is an unauthorized user being able to sneak into the
network and access a light source (laser) to launch a signal
with higher power than other authorized channels, targeting
nonlinearity in the fiber and degradation of Optical Signal
to Noise Ratio (OSNR) and Bit Error Rate (BER) of other
neighboring channels.
Figure 1 presents an illustration of the studied jamming attack
model in an optical network, including a transmitter, series
of spans (EDFA connected to an optical fiber) and a receiver.
The two type of jamming attack are shown in the figure. The
out-of-band jamming is represented by an unauthorized signal
inserted by Jammer 1 in the 2nd channel with  dB higher
power than the legitimate channels. The in-band jamming is
represented by Jammer 2 who gets an access to the fiber after
multiplexing all signals. Jammer 2 choose a victim channel
(ch4) and add  dB power on top of the legitimate one.
Proposition 1. The power of a jammed channel PJ is equal
to P +  dB, in both type of attacks (in-band and out-of-band
jamming).
Proof. it is clear.
Therefore, we formulate our model as follows: a jammer
J can insert a high power signal in one or more channels
in order to disrupt the service. We denote by MJ ⊂ M the
set of jammed channels. We assume that the power of J is
PJ = P + , where P is the power of the rest of channels,
and  is the additional power.
The proposed jamming attack aware physical impairment
model can be resumed by the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The jamming attack aware SNR equation associ-
ated to a connection i using a route ri can be expressed as
follows:
SNRm =
Gm
GASE +GNLI,s +GJ
(1)
Where Gm is the signal power spectral density (PSD) of
connection i using a channel m, GASE is the PSD of the
amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) noise, GNLI,s is the
PSD of the noise from nonlinear impairments (NLI) in a secure
network, and GJ is the PSD of the noise from nonlinear
impairments (NLI) caused by jamming.
Proof. We consider the physical layer model in [12], which
provides an explicit expression of the signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) considering the characteristics of the non-linear inter-
ference (NLI). The SNR associated to a connection i using a
route ri can be expressed as follows:
SNRm =
Gm
GASE +GNLI
(2)
Where GNLI is the PSD of the noise from nonlinear impair-
ments (NLI).
The PSD of connection i using a channel m is written as:
Gm =
Pm
∆m
(3)
Where Pm is the power corresponding to Gm, and ∆m denotes
the bandwidth and considered constant for all links in the
connection.
The PSD of ASE can be expressed as follows:
GASE =
∑
l∈ri
NlG
ASE
0 , G
ASE
0 = (e
αL − 1)Fhν (4)
Where Nl is the number of spans on link l, L is the length of
each span, α is the power attenuation, F is the spontaneous
emission factor, h is Plancks constant, and ν is the light
frequency.
The PSD of the noise from NLI is:
GNLI =
∑
l∈ri
NlG
NLI
l (5)
and using eq. (16) in [12] and eq.(1) in [13],
GNLIl (fm) = φGm[G
2
marcsinh(ρ(∆fm)
2)
+
M∑
m′=1
m′ 6=m
G2m′ ln(
fm,m′ + ∆fm′/2
fm,m′ −∆fm′/2)] (6)
and,
φ =
3γ2
2piα|β2| , ρ =
pi2|β2|
2α
(7)
Where fm is the center frequency of channel m. m′ is
another connection using link l, ∆fm′ is the bandwidths for
connection m′, fm,m′ = |fm − fm′ | is the center frequency
spacing between connections m and m′, γ is the fiber
nonlinearity coefficient, and β2 is the fiber dispersion.
Using eq. (3), the squared PSD of a jammed channel m′
can be expressed in terms of a non jammed channel m as:
G2m′ =
P 2J
∆2m′
=
(P + )2
∆2m
= G2m +
2 + 2P
∆2m
(8)
Thus,
GNLIl (fm) = G
NLI,s
l (fm) +G
J
l (fm) (9)
such that,
GNLI,sl (fm) = φG
3
m[arcsinh(ρ(∆fm)
2)
+
M∑
m′=1
m′ 6=m
ln(
fm,m′ + ∆fm′/2
fm,m′ −∆fm′/2)] (10)
and,
GJl (fm) = φGm
2 + 2P
∆2m
∑
m′∈MJ
m′ 6=m
ln(
fm,m′ + ∆fm′/2
fm,m′ −∆fm′/2)
(11)
Where GNLI,sl (fm) is the PSD of the noise from NLI in a
secure network in link l (used in [14] and [15]), and GJl (fm)
is the PSD of the noise from NLI caused by jamming in link
l. Thus, we define GNLI,s =
∑
l∈ri NlG
NLI,s
l the PSD of the
noise from nonlinear impairments (NLI) in a secure network,
and GJ =
∑
l∈ri NlG
J
l the PSD of the noise from nonlinear
impairments (NLI) caused by jamming.
Therefore, the jamming attack aware SNR equation associated
to a connection i using a route ri can be expressed as eq. (1).
In the network operational phase, the SNR value is verified
by the control plane, as a way of maintaining the QoT of
connections according to the standard provided by the Service
Level Agreement (SLA). Therefore, to have an acceptable
QoT, circuits should maintain the SNR value above the SNR
threshold (SNRth) allowed by the network. Thus, circuits with
a SNR lower than the SNRth are not established. Moreover,
circuits that will decrease the SNR of the already established
circuits to have a value lower than the SNRth are blocked as
well.
In the following Section, we present the performance
evaluation of the proposed model using link and network
simulations.
III. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we analyze the impact of jamming attacks
on online network scenarios. We start our analysis using a
basic network topology with two nodes and one bidirectional
link between them. It is important to figure out the effect of
jamming in one link to understand the nonlinearity patterns
that may occur due to such high power attack. During the
simulation, we choose to launch the jamming in a fixed slot
range. The reason of fixing the position of the attacker is
to be able to study the impact of in-band jamming on the
chosen slots, and out-of-band jamming along the neighboring
slots by looking to slots utilization. Afterward, we consider
a more general network scenario including 6 nodes and 8
bidirectional links. In this topology, the occurrence of jamming
is considered in only one link during the whole simulation, and
similar to the link scenario, the jamming slot range is fixed.
The effect of jamming can be propagated to other links through
the circuits that cross the jammed slots in the attacked link.
Figure 2 shows the topologies used in the simulations, and the
distance of each link in km.
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Fig. 2. (a) Single-link and (b) evaluated topology. Distances are shown in
km and jammed links in red.
Simulations are made with ONS simulator [16]. In both
scenarios, we consider links with 320 slots for each direction.
We generate 100,000 circuit requests, which follow a Poisson
distribution with mean holding time of 600 seconds, following
a negative exponential distribution and uniformly-distributed
among all nodes-pairs. We use 3 different values of bandwidth
which are 50, 100 and 200 Gbps, uniformly selected. To
solve the routing and spectrum assignment (RSA) problem,
we adopt the basic Dijkstra algorithm for routing, and the
First Fit policy for slot assignment. The guardband between
two adjacent lightpaths is assumed to be 2 slots. The circuits
use 16QAM modulation, with SNRth equal to 15 [14]. The
parameters for the SNR calculation are shown in table I [14]:
TABLE I
PARAMETERS FOR SNR CALCULATION.
Variable Value
PTX 0 dB
∆f 12.5 GHz
α 0.2 dB/km
L 100
γ 1.22Wkm−1
β2 16ps2/km
v 1.93× 1014Hz
F 6 dB
The jamming is fixed in a 10-slots range, with indexes from
140 to 149. Thus, all the generated circuits that are using
those slots will be affected by the jamming attack. We vary
the jamming power from 0 to 5 dB, in a step of 0.5 dB.
In both scenarios (one-link and full network), there is a
higher blocking probability for a jamming power close to
1.75 dB, reaching a value of blocking 20.1% higher than the
scenario without jamming for the full network. This is because
with this jamming power, it is still possible to establish
multiple jammed circuits, which generate greater impact on
the QoT of the circuits that will still be established on the
network.
As the power of the inserted jamming increases, the inter-
ference provided by the jammed circuits in the neighboring
slots also increases. According to the proposed model, the
interference is more intense between spectrally nearby slots.
When evaluating the SNR between one established jammed
circuit and a new jammed circuit with great spectral proximity,
the control plane does not approve the establishment of the
new jammed circuit, as the high interference violates the
SNRth. Therefore, less circuits under jamming interference are
established close to each other, which causes less interference
in the network as a whole and consequently there is a reduction
in the blocking probability.
A. Jamming Effect on a Single Link
For evaluating the single link scenario, i.e two nodes and
one link with multiple spans (Fig. 2(a)), we adopt the proposed
attack model shown in equation (1). In our simulation, we
consider 10 replications and we adopt the average value of
results, considering a tolerable standard deviation. The load is
set to 120 Erlang. The average slots utilization is measured
during the simulation as well as the blocking probability. To
calculate the average slots utilization, the status of all slots
is checked when a new request arrives in the network. The
occupied slots (by circuits or by guard band) are identified, and
their respective counter is increased by one. At the end, the
utilization percentage is verified considering the total number
of circuit requests generated in the simulation.
We analyze mainly two metrics, which are the blocking
probability and average slots utilization. The blocking prob-
ability indicates the relation between the number of blocked
circuits in the network and the number of circuits generated,
and it shown in figure 5 for the two studied scenarios (one-
link and full network). Figure 3 illustrates the slot utilization
rate for the single link scenario under different jamming power
values. We zoom-in on the critical slots affected by jamming
to see clearly the degree of harmness in term of utilization
percentage. The range of jammed slots is colored with red for
the ease of reading the figure.
The decreasing curve for the slot utilization in the scenario
without the jamming attack is justified by the application of
the First Fit policy, in which the allocation is preferably made
in the lowest index slots. With the application of low power
jamming (0.5 and 1.0 dB), the impact observed on the network
remains indistinguishable, and the curve of slot utilization in
Fig. 3 remains with behavior similar to the scenario without the
jamming attack. However, the blocking probability increases
exponentially in this interval of additional jamming values
from 4% to 5.8% (see figure 5). From 1 to 1.75 dB jamming,
slots utilization in the jamming interval and in neighboring
slots, especially slots with higher indexes, start to decrease
slowly, while the blocking probability increases considerably
from 6% to 19%, to reach the max. value of blocking 19%
when the additional jamming power is around 1.75 dB. (fig.
5)
From the occurrence of 1.5 dB jamming, it is clear to see
the impact of in-band jamming on the utilization of jammed
slots (140-149) which is sharply reduced, until it reached the
null value when the additional jamming power is higher than
3 dB. Attacks with 1.5 dB and 2.0 dB jamming also have a
huge impact on the slot utilization outside the jammed area,
characterizing the out-of-band jamming. This is because the
established jammed circuits have a low SNR value, near the
SNRth, and prevent the formation of new circuits, as these
would take the SNR value of the circuits already established
to values below the acceptable SNRth in the network. This
impact is more intense on the slots near the jammed slot range.
After 2.5 dB, jamming starts to affect slots in the attacked
range more intensely. When a very intense jamming occurs,
two jammed circuits cannot be allocated with great spectral
proximity, as there is a greater impact on the QoT and
consequently, on the SNR value. Thus, jamming values above
2.5 dB in the evaluated scenario turns unusable the jammed
slot range, after the establishment of the first jammed circuit.
From 1.75 to 3 dB jamming, the blocking probability
decreases rapidly from 19% to 4%, which can be explained by
the fact that the control plane tends to avoid the assignment
of circuits in the jammed range due to their low SNR value.
Thus, the jamming effect is rarely seen in the network and the
blocking probability becomes lower when the utilization rate
is close to zero.
B. Jamming Effect on a Network
In the full network scenario (Fig. 2(b)), 5 replications are
simulated, with a load of 400 Erlang. The measured standard
deviation values are around 0.02 %, and the average error value
is around 0.01% for the blocking probability. The jamming
attack is applied in the link between nodes B and C, in a
fixed slot range (140-149).
Figure 4 shows the effects of jamming attack on slots uti-
lization rate in the network, which represents the average
utilization for all links in the network. We observe a less
intense reduction in slots utilization compared to the link case.
However, the reduction is still high in the range of jammed
slots; for a jamming of 4 dB, the utilization of slots 140-149 is
between 25% and 30%. When  is higher than 3 dB, we remark
a small oscillation of the utilization curve in the neighboring
slots, then curves converge rapidly to the value of no jamming
scenario. Thus, in a network, the out-of-band jamming effect
is not visible for high jamming power when we monitor the
average slots utilization.
Figure 5 shows that the blocking probability curve for the
network scenario has a similar monotonic behavior as the
single link scenario, but with lower blocking intensity. The
maximum blocking probability is reached at a jamming power
around 1,75 dB, but with an increase of only 2% (from ≈ 7%
to ≈ 9%).
C. Impact of Multiple Jammers
Jamming attacks can be realized by more than one jammer
to increase service disruption. As a result, it is interesting to
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Fig. 3. Jamming effect in a single link.
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consider a scenario in which the network is under several
attacks. For the simplicity of the simulation, we adopt a
network with a single link, we set the number of jammers
to 3, where each jammer is using 10 consecutive slots: 50-59,
140-149, and 230-239.
Figure 6 shows the impact of multi-jammers attack on
slots utilization, regarding different values of jamming power,
 = 0, 0.5, .., 5 dB. When the jamming power is less than 1
dB, the effect on slots utilization is not clearly visible, while
the blocking increase from 3% to 7%. When  reaches the
value 2 dB, we see the highest out-of-band effect where slots
utilization is affected with different intensities along all the
link, and the blocking probability has its highest value around
32%. For this value of jamming, the effect of in-band jamming
is close to the effect of out-of-band jamming in terms of
slots utilization, which means that this point presents the best
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Fig. 6. Impact of 3 jammers in a single link.
value for an attacker to disrupt neighboring channels. In the
previous parts, we saw that the highest blocking and highest
out-of-band effect are obtained for a jamming power around
1.75 dB, and in this case when we added other jammers in
different position, this best point for jammer has changed. This
result opens an interesting direction of research to study the
impact of jamming position on blocking probability and slots
utilization, and a theoretical analysis could be a good start for
a future work.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we analyzed jamming power attacks in elastic
optical networks, by embedding the insertion of jamming
power into the physical layer model. We studied the impact of
in-band and out-of-band jamming on the blocking probability
and slots utilization into two different network topologies,
considering different values of jamming power. Furthermore,
we discussed the case of multiple attackers, where each one is
using different frequency slots range. For in-band jamming, the
results showed that slots utilization decreases with the increase
of jamming power, and becomes null when the jamming power
is higher than 3 dB, while for out-of-band jamming, the
impact is maximal for a specific jamming power, 1.75 dB
in our simulation. When we considered multiple positions of
attackers, we obtained the highest blocking probability 32%
for a specific jamming power 2 dB, as a result, we conclude
that the impact of jamming depends on attacker positions as
well as the jamming power. As a future work, we plan to study
the relationship between jamming power, attackers position,
blocking probability and slots utilization, to provide a clear
understanding of jamming attacks for detection and prevention
studies.
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